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习近平副主席访问非洲三国

2010年11月16日至24日，国家副主席习近平应邀对南非、安哥拉和博茨瓦纳进行正式访问。

习近平副主席此访是在国际形势发生深刻复杂变化、发展中国家整体地位上升、我快速发展备受各方瞩目的大背景下进行的，是在中非合作论坛成立10周年之际进行的。习副主席此访作为今年我国中非外交的一项重大外交行动，受到到访国的高度重视，均给予高规格礼遇和热情友好接待。有关国家和国际媒体高度关注，作了基调积极的报道和评论，在到访国、所在地区和国际社会产生良好反响。

访问期间，习副主席本着“巩固传统友好，扩大战略互信，深化务实合作，促进共同发展”的方针，就巩固和提升双边关系和各领域合作分别与三国元首、政府和议会领导人深入、坦诚交换看法，全面总结了双边关系发展所取得的经验和成果；广泛接触经济、文化及社会各界人士，有针对性地做工作；出席经贸、能源、金融、人文等领域一系列双边合作协议的签字仪式，并出席多场经贸和人文交流活动。在纪念中非合作论坛成立10周年研讨会开幕式发表演讲，在安哥拉中资企业负责人座谈会上作重要讲话。每到一处，习副主席还会见驻当地使领馆、中资机构、医疗队、华侨华人和留学生代表，向他们介绍党的十七届五中全会精神和国内改革发展情况，鼓励他们为增进中国与到访国的友好合作多做贡献。

习副主席此访行程紧凑，高效务实、成果丰硕。

一、巩固传统友好，深化双边关系

南非等非洲三国均是所在地区有重要影响或较有代表性的国家，巩固我与四国传统友好关系符合两国和两国人民根本利益。习近平副主席在与三国领导人会谈会见中全面回顾并积极评价双边关系，表示愿进一步巩固传统友好，加强与三国各层次交往，共同推动双边合作关系不断向前发展。

会见南非领导人时，习副主席积极评价中国与南非建交以来两国关系的发展，表示中方愿继续同南方一道，推动两国全方位合作。在访问安哥拉和博茨瓦纳时，习副主席高度评价我同两国的传统友谊和丰硕的合作成果，并同两国领导人共同展望了双边关系发展前景，一致认为，加强互利合作符合两国人民根本和长远利益。

访问期间，三国国家元首、政府首脑、资政、议长等分别同习副主席会见会谈，均表示坚定支持中国和平统一大业和维护核心利益，并愿同中方在重大地区、国际问题上加强沟通与合作。三国社会各界人士纷纷对习副主席到访表示热烈欢迎，普遍认为此访对增进友好交往，深化务实合作，进一步提升我与到访国关系具有重要意义。南非领导人对习副主席在祖马总统访华后不到三个月即到访该国深感高兴，认为这充分显示了南中全面战略伙伴关系的良好发展，并表示今后将与中方巩固兄弟般的友谊，发展更为密切的合作，继续在台湾、涉藏等重大敏感问题上坚定支持中方。安哥拉领导人赞赏中方在经济社会发展中取得的突出成就，表示愿意多向中方学习借鉴发展经验，并对中方多年来提供的无私援助深表感谢。访问期间，双方发表联合声明，决定建立战略伙伴关系。博方表示，中国是博的全天候朋友，多年来给予博宝贵援助，博对此心存感激。习副主席此访对进一步提升两国关系具有重要意义。

二、拓展务实合作，实现共同发展

深化与三国在经贸等领域的互利务实合作是贯穿习近平副主席此访的重要主题。访问期

间，习副主席利用各种机会广做各界工作，指明双方合作方向和重点，增强各方与我合作愿望。

访问南非期间，习副主席同莫特兰蒂副总统共同主持了中南国家双边委员会第四次全会，双方就落实两国元首共识、推动落实《北京宣言》提出的各项目标达成广泛一致。习副主席表示，中方愿结合南政府制定的“新增长路线”，从推动双边贸易平衡增长、加强基础设施建设、制造业、矿产、绿色经济、金融等领域合作入手，全方位推动和深化两国务实合作。习副主席对安哥拉和博茨瓦纳的访问有力推动了我与两个国家现有合作项目的进展，双方还就中国企业与安、博两国企业在基础设施、能源和投资等领域开展互利合作达成共识。我分别向安和博提供 6000 万元人民币和 4000 万元人民币无偿援助。

访问期间，习近平副主席深入考察了安哥拉罗安达省基兰巴基阿希市安居住宅工程，并在安哥拉的中资企业负责人亲切座谈。习副主席表示，加强中非合作是大势所趋、人心所向，中非关系基础比以往任何时候都更加坚实，双方经贸合作潜力巨大。在“十二五”时期，我国将按照互利共赢的开放战略，进一步推动更多中资企业“走出去”，逐步完善对非“走出去”的产业布局。习副主席勉励更多中资企业深入实施对非“走出去”战略，不断充实中非合作内涵、提升中非合作层次，积极推进经营本地化和国际化战略，巩固扩大中非友好的社会基础和民意基础，成为名副其实的中非友好建设者、促进者、维护者。

三、宣介内外政策，扩大战略互信

当前国际上总体认同中国和平发展，同时对中国的发展也有一些疑虑。访问期间，习副主席在会谈、会见和演讲中，向三国领导人和各界人士全面深入地介绍了我发展道路、发展理念，生动宣介十七届五中全会和“十二五”规划建议精神，深入阐述我睦邻友好周边外交政策与和平发展前景，取得明显成效。尤其是在纪念中非合作论坛成立 10 周年研讨会上，习副主席深入浅出地回答了人们普遍关心的中国成为世界第二大经济体以及中国进一步发展起来以后将如何处理同外部世界特别是周边国家的关系问题，强调中国对内坚持科学发展、和谐发展、协调发展，对外坚持和平发展、开放发展、合作发展，中国进一步发展起来不会对别国构成威胁，只会给世界特别是周边地区带来越来越多的发展机遇。

在纪念中非合作论坛成立 10 周年研讨会开幕式上，习副主席发表题为《共创中非新型战略伙伴关系的美好未来》的主旨演讲，并在非洲三国多个场合用大量事例阐明中非合作给非洲带来实实在在的好处，强调加强同非洲国家的团结合作是中国对外政策的重要基石，也是中方长期、坚定的战略选择。习副主席关于新形势下我对加强中非合作论坛建设、促进中非关系发展的政策主张，增强了往访非洲三国对论坛发展的信心。

南非、安哥拉、博茨瓦纳领导人均称赞我为非洲发展所作贡献，希我进一步加大对非投入。南非希我重视和支持非洲跨国跨区域基础设施建设。参加纪念中非合作论坛成立 10 周年研讨会的非洲学者普遍认为中非关系越密切，非洲受益就越多。

四、促进人文交流，夯实民意基础

习副主席高度重视人文交流在发展国与国关系中所发挥的作用。习副主席访问南非时宣布大幅增加中国政府奖学金名额；访问安哥拉时宣布在 2010/2011 学年为安增加 62 个中国政府奖学金学生名额；访问博茨瓦纳时表示将继续支持在该国的孔子学院建设，并在汉语教学的教材、师资培训等方面提供必要支持。习副主席还衷心感谢三国积极参与和支持上海世博会，推动三国同我一道加强人文领域的交流与合作。三国均表示将与中方共同努力，深化人民之间的相互沟通和友谊。

注：本文采自中非合作论坛网站，此处有改动。原文题为《外交部副部长翟隽谈习近平副主席访问亚非四国》(<http://www.focac.org/chn/zt/xjpAfrica2010/t772051.htm>)

苏丹公投

编者按：根据相关协议，苏丹将于明年初举行公投，决定南方是否独立。由此可能产生的问题仍难以预料，但苏丹形势已渐趋紧张，国际社会的神经也被拨动。苏丹南北冲突问题由来已久，且错综复杂，本期摘选文章对相关问题作了简单介绍。文章来自 International Crisis Group，更多资料可登录该网站查阅。

苏丹冲突简介

(除介绍南北冲突问题外，还介绍了达尔富尔问题)

Africa's largest country, Sudan is divided along lines of religion (70 per cent Muslim, 25 per cent animist, 5 per cent Christian), ethnicity (African, Arab origin), tribe, and economic activity (nomadic and sedentary). Since its independence in 1956, the country has been characterized by ongoing centre - periphery tensions. As a result, Sudan has been in a state of near constant war, the deadliest conflicts being those between North and South 1956-1972 and 1983-2005, and, more recently, the conflict in Darfur.

Having successfully resisted Egyptian domination since pre-modern times, Sudan was finally conquered by Ottoman-Egyptian forces in 1820. Unable to defeat a Sudanese revolt led by the self-appointed Mahdi ("guided one") in 1885, the loose administration that ran the country collapsed. 4 years later Egyptian forces, now reinforced by the British, re-captured Khartoum and established the jointly-administered Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Under the British divide and rule strategy, the country was separated into North and South. In 1947 political power was granted to the northern elite, which retained it following independence in 1956. Anticipating marginalisation by the North, southern army officers mutinied in 1955, and formed the Anya-Nya ("snake venom") guerrilla movement, which began launching attacks on government troops. In the North, in 1958 General Abboud seized power in a coup d'état and began instituting a policy of Islamisation.

With Abboud himself forced out of office by a 1964 popular uprising, several Arab-dominated governments followed until, in 1969, General Nimieri gained power through a coup d'état. A failed 1971 Communist coup left Nimieri politically isolated, pushing him to seek peace with Ethiopia, Uganda and southern rebels. The Addis Ababa peace agreement with the Anya-Nya in March 1972 granted autonomy to the South and integrated the guerrillas into the national army.

Systematic violations of the agreement by the government, combined with an increasing Islamic shift in late 1970s and discovery of oil in the South eventually led to a resumption of hostilities and the deployment of northern troops in southern oil-rich areas. Following a mutiny by southern troops against the government in early 1983, President Nimieri abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement in June, dissolving the South's constitutional guarantees and declaring Arabic the official language. Islamic

Sharia law replaced traditional Sudanese law 3 months later. Southern grievances crystallised around the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) led by John Garang. A popular uprising overthrew Nimieri in 1985 and Sadiq al-Mahdi's democratic government (Umma Party) was elected the following year.

Moves towards reaching peace between the SPLA/M and the government stalled when the National Islamic Front (NIF) led a bloodless coup June in 1989, a day before a bill suspending Sharia law was to be passed. Led by General Omar al-Bashir, the NIF (later renamed National Congress Party – NCP) revoked the constitution, banned opposition parties, moved to Islamise the judicial system and stepped up the North-South war, proclaiming jihad against the non-Muslim South.

With the SPLA/M weakened by the 1991 fall of the Mengitsu regime in Ethiopia and internal disputes, inter-ethnic fighting broke out in the South. Khartoum's harbouring of Osama bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalist groups in the early 1990s led to international isolation. In 1998, the US responded with a cruise-missile attack to terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.

On-off negotiations between the government and the SPLA under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) made little progress between 1994 and 2001. The July 2002 Machakos Protocol stipulated a self-determination referendum for the South after six-year period, while maintaining Sharia law in the North. The January 2005 Naivasha Accords formally ended the North-South war with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement incorporated the SPLA/M into a Government of National Unity (GNU) and created a schedule for 2009 national elections, later pushed back to 2010. While implementation stalled – largely due to absence of political will within the ruling NCP – a new constitution was ratified and a new government installed in October 2006. Tensions between Khartoum and Sudan's peripheral areas persisted, however, and in some parts fuelled a new cycle of violence.

In the South, the July 2007 deadline for the withdrawal of government troops passed without any national or international response. The face-off between Arab militia and the SPLA/M continued in the oil-rich Abyei region on the North-South border, which had been granted special administrative status by the CPA. In March 2008, renewed fighting broke out between the army and the SPLA/M, displacing some 100.000 people from the region. Amid fears of a return to full-scale civil war, in June both parties signed the Abyei Roadmap, which called for the deployment of a joint military force and the submission of the Abyei border dispute to the Hague-based Permanent Court for Arbitration (PCA). In 2009, the PCA ruling called for a redrawing of the region's borders ahead of the 2011 referendum.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed to address many demands of the eastern groups that fought in the North-South conflict. A separate agreement (Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement) regulating power and wealth sharing at the regional level was signed between the government and Eastern Front rebel groups in October 2006. Confidence in the government's commitment remained low however. Progress was finally made in May 2007 when al-Bashir appointed 3 Eastern Front officials to

government positions.

In Darfur simmering tensions reached their boiling point in February 2003, when rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – predominantly from the African Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit tribes – attacked a government garrison. The government responded with military force, relying heavily on the Arab Janjaweed militia. After a series of military victories, the militia began ethnically cleansing the African tribes. Despite the 2004 deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), attacks on civilians continued and Khartoum failed to rein in the militias. Insecurity was compounded by inter-rebel fighting and the 2005 outbreak of war between Sudan and Chad, which continued intermittently in the form of proxy-wars until an agreement between al-Bashir and Chadian President Idriss Deby was reached in February 2010.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by the government and one SLA/M faction (led by Minni Minawi, SLA/MM) in May 2006, but was undermined by the absence of other parties. Splintering of groups further complicated the situation, and inner-group tensions on both sides contributed to a rise in attacks on civilians and humanitarian aid workers. The military standoff reached a high point when JEM troops attempted an assault on Khartoum in May 2008 as a response to major aerial and ground attacks by the government. Initially refusing to accept the presence of a UN mission to replace the AU, the government finally relented to the proposal of a hybrid mission (UNAMID), which replaced AMIS in January 2008.

Since the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the JEM in February 2010, little has been achieved in terms of implementation, as each side accuses the other of breaching the agreement. In March 2005, the UNSC referred the Darfur situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Having issued arrest warrants for a government minister and the Janjaweed commander in 2007, the ICC issued warrants for President Omar al-Bashir himself, initially for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2007, and finally also for genocide in July 2010. They mark the first time the Court has issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state. So far, however, no action has been taken against al-Bashir by Sudan or by neighbouring governments.

The implementation of all three major mechanisms to end conflict, the CPA, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement, has been unsatisfactory, largely due to the resistance of al-Bashir's ruling NCP. As agreed in the CPA, multiparty elections were held in Sudan in 2010 and a referendum on Southern independence is planned for January 2011. Boycotted by most opposition parties and marred by incidents of violence, the elections were still largely seen as a step forward. However, as the deadline for the 2011 referendum, which is highly likely to result in southern independence, approaches, the basic foundations for a post-referendum relationship between North and South are yet to be laid. Mistrust between the parties remains high, and the still unresolved issue of Abyei and other North-South borders complicate the political environment.

Securing the referendum is the top priority, for the GoS and the GoSS as well as for

neighbouring countries, regional actors, and the broader international community. In practice, this means reassuring both the GoS about its political and economic future, and the GoSS that the referendum will happen and its result be accepted. At the same time, neglecting the groundwork for positive post-referendum relations would be short-sighted and possibly a recipe for renewed conflict. Pressing the parties to complete these tasks before the end of the CPA period is the surest way to guarantee a peaceful transition in the near term and a stable relationship in the long run.

区域相关国家的态度

South Sudan is just eight months away from a self-determination referendum that will likely result in its secession from the North. Much remains to be done to implement the outstanding elements of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and time is running out. The agreement's underlying aim of "making unity attractive" has failed, and most Southerners thus appear determined to choose independence. Neighbouring states are increasingly focused on the fragile circumstances in Sudan and the likelihood of a newly independent state in the region. Support from Sudan's neighbours for the referendum process and respect for its result will be crucial to ensuring peace and stability in the country and the region.

Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt are among the immediate regional states that matter most, as well as Eritrea and Libya. If a credible referendum is held in accordance with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution, and Khartoum endorses the process, recognition of a new Southern state should prove relatively uncomplicated for the region and CPA signatories more broadly. If, however, the process does not go according to plan – particularly if Khartoum attempts to manipulate, deny or delay the exercise or its result – regional states and institutions will need to consider how best to respond to ensure respect for the CPA and the right of self-determination and to avoid a new conflict. Not enough planning is being done in this regard.

Each border state has interests at stake and will be directly affected by either peaceful separation or a return to conflict. Despite differing views on unity, all are likely to accept the referendum on self-determination and honour its outcome, provided it goes ahead as planned. While the decision of the South Sudanese is paramount, strategic considerations will undoubtedly play a role in how each state responds if the process is disrupted. Responses will depend largely on circumstances and events, but an assessment of historical relationships, recent engagement and strategic interests sheds light on the positions of the key regional actors.

Having hosted and led the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly strong interest in seeing it implemented successfully. As the economic powerhouse in the region, it stands to benefit from the development of a considerable market and major

infrastructure in the South, including as a conduit for oil. Kenya long managed to be pro-South without being anti-North, but diplomatic relations with Khartoum have shown signs of strain as its Southern leanings have become increasingly clear.

Uganda, the most unambiguous supporter of independence, seeks a stable buffer on its northern border, not least to ensure that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency does not return to its doorstep. Trade has tripled in recent years with the South, which is now the largest importer of Ugandan goods. While the official policy is respect for the CPA and the will of the Southern people, some officials in Kampala are privately encouraging independence.

Egypt prefers unity and has arguably done more than Khartoum to make it attractive. It opposed including self-determination in the CPA talks, preferring instead to promote its own initiative premised on unity. It has recently redoubled diplomatic efforts to prevent partition, in part because it fears a new state – and an unstable one at that – could pose a threat both to regional stability and its precious supply of Nile water.

While its support to South Sudan is evident, Ethiopia has multiple interests to balance, so it is careful to toe a neutral line on independence. It provided military support to the SPLM in the 1990s, in part to counter Islamist elements in Khartoum whose destabilizing activities posed a threat to Ethiopian and regional security. Regional security remains its primary concern, given the volatile situation in Somalia, continued confrontation with Eritrea and its own domestic fragility. Addis can afford neither renewed war in Sudan nor to antagonise Khartoum, lest it find itself with another hostile neighbour. It supports the right of self-determination and will respect independence but is more likely to seek a common regional position than be out front on any difficult decisions if the process is derailed.

As with other foreign policy issues, Libya's Sudan policy is driven personally by Muammar Qaddafi, and unsurprisingly, the outspoken Colonel has proven unpredictable on this issue. While he has several times pledged support for Southern independence, he has also cautioned Juba on the dangers of forging a new state. Eritrea's position on Southern independence is likewise unreliable. During the last civil war, Asmara and its army provided critical backing to the SPLA/M (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) and other opposition groups in Sudan, supporting regime change in Khartoum. However, Isaias Afwerki's recent actions indicate that his policy may be driven more by self-preservation than principle. Increasingly isolated in the region and beyond and in need of economic assistance, Asmara's dwindling list of allies has led it to a rapprochement with Khartoum.

The referendum is to be held six months before the end of the CPA's six-year Interim Period. If Southerners choose to go their own way, it is during the ensuing half-year window that any disputes over, as well the transition to, independence must be resolved. While pragmatic tones are emerging in Khartoum, attempts to delay or derail the exercise are not out of the question. Neither the SPLM nor its regional supporters want a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The SPLM is aware of the risks that would accompany it and is working hard to avoid such a scenario. But

if pushed into a corner, the possibility of UDI is very real.

If either side abrogates the CPA, a return to conflict is likely and would undoubtedly affect the region and draw in some of its militaries. This must be avoided. Regional actors will face a delicate task in calibrating their response if the referendum is denied or its result contested, including the possibility of extending recognition to the South. The broader international community will seek to adjust its response in light of African opinion. Policy coherence between IGAD and the African Union (AU) is crucial. IGAD's members will likely be the first to make any recommendations regarding Southern Sudan's post-referendum status, but ensuring AU participation in, and ultimate backing of, that policy is crucial if an independent South is to secure maximum legitimacy. The weight of the AU – an instinctively pro-unity institution – and the importance of its recognition cannot be ignored. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) can play a leading role in lining up the body's 53 member states in support of realities on the ground.

Regional states must prepare for South Sudan's possible independence by engaging Khartoum and Juba on practicalities of the referendum and peaceful implementation of its outcome. This includes insistence per the March 2010 IGAD summit communiqué calling for the referendum commissions to be established by May 2010 and reiterating firm support for the referendum timeline. Preparations should include clear modalities for extending official recognition to the South if it votes for independence and developing policy responses to alternative scenarios, including UDI. In the event of disputes over the referendum or its result, regional states should engage the AUHIP and IGAD to ensure the right of self-determination is fully respected and modalities for implementation of its outcome are agreed.

南北边界如何确定？

The January 2011 referendum on self-determination could result in Sudan's partition, and the country's North-South border may ultimately become the world's newest international boundary. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended two decades of civil war called for the border between the North and the semi-autonomous South to be demarcated within six months. Five years later, the task remains incomplete. The sooner the parties break the border deadlock the better, though the process need not necessarily be completed prior to the referendum as Khartoum has argued previously. Furthermore, a solution to the border is about not only drawing a line, but also defining the nature and management of that border and the future relations of communities on both sides. A "soft" boundary is ideal, one backed by a framework for cross-border arrangements and, if necessary, safeguarded by a joint monitoring mechanism. Progress toward both demarcating and defining the border will prevent it from becoming a source of renewed conflict in the post-CPA era.

The undefined boundary has hindered CPA implementation, fuelled mistrust between its signatories and, most recently, contributed to heightened anxiety and insecurity along the border. The governments in Khartoum and Juba alike rely heavily on oil revenues that derive primarily from the border lands. The concentration of resources there has amplified the political and economic dimensions of an already contentious task. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have exhibited an aggressive military posture in some border areas. And many of the country's trans-boundary populations – some of whom represent significant political constituencies – fear possible secession of the South could result in a hardening of the boundary and a threat to their livelihood.

This important issue has for far too long been tied up in the Technical Border Committee (TBC), the body mandated to demarcate the border as it stood at Independence Day in 1956. The committee's extensive deliberations – as well as a poisoned atmosphere – have led to an impasse. Solid information regarding the process, the work of those tasked to undertake it and the disputed areas has been scarce, leading to considerable confusion and speculation among political elites, border communities and international partners. While the committee has agreed on most of the border, five specific areas are disputed on technical grounds; and others remain contested in the public arena. Any prolonged review of maps and records is unlikely to yield agreement on the disputed areas, underscoring that this is no longer a technical issue, but a political one, and should be treated as such.

The two parties that signed the CPA – the long ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) – began critical negotiations on post-referendum arrangements in July 2010. Border demarcation is not an agenda item, but the issues of border management and cross-border relations will undoubtedly arise and be affected by several others that are, including citizenship, national resources, economic cooperation, grazing rights and security. Progress on these fronts may lessen the potential impact of where exactly the boundary is drawn in the end.

The type of border and its exact location could well become bargaining chips in a grander set of trade-offs that will define the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements. And, while not everyone will be satisfied in the end, stability along the border will depend in part on the extent to which local actors feel they have had some role in defining border management and trans-border relations. Border communities are among those most directly affected by the current atmosphere of post-referendum uncertainty; examination of the disputed areas illustrates that the border can mean very different things to political elites than it does to the communities who live on it. It is essential to feed into the post-referendum negotiations the promising work county and state actors, as well as international partners, are doing to lay the foundation for future cross-border relations. The NCP and SPLM, in concert with the UN and international partners, should:

Recognise that resolution of the outstanding border disputes is no longer a technical issue, but a political one. As such, the national presidency – possibly through the

recently established joint committee headed by Pagan Amum (SPLM) and Salah Gosh (NCP) – should assume full responsibility for achieving a solution. It should also decide on an agency to implement the demarcation, agree to UN participation in that process, and act upon renewed commitments to resume demarcation in the undisputed areas.

Establish a sensitisation and feedback mechanism to allow border communities to contribute advice and ideas directly to negotiations on cross-border arrangements. Such a mechanism should also communicate to border communities the goals of those arrangements, namely that a vote for separation should not mean the boundary will become a barrier, and that movement, trade, grazing rights and the interests of host communities will be protected. The “Tamazuj” forum – aimed at cooperation and integration among border state communities – is an appropriate framework for such a channel.

Design one or more complementary border-monitoring mechanisms to support a soft and stable boundary, ensure the rights and responsibilities of border populations, and possibly monitor population movements and new security arrangements. This may include a monitoring and observation role for the UN and/or an alternative with a light footprint, high mobility and a focus on building local relationships, funded by international partners and employing lessons learned from previous models that have been used in Sudan.